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INTRODUCTION

T

he two traditional building blocks of customary international law, state practice and opinio juris, are increasingly proving inadequate in explaining the process of norm formation1 on the international level. The current conceptualization of the primitive or “customary” element of international
law has, within the past thirty years, become increasingly obsolete as the international legal system has begun to resemble its
national counterparts. The growth of transnational actors2
such as, international criminal tribunals, has resulted in a de1. In this article, norms are defined as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.” See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887,
891 (1998).
2. The most widely accepted definition of what constitutes a transnational actor is the one first offered by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in
1971. Keohane and Nye define transnational actors as forces engaged in “contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries.” See Joseph S. Nye
& Robert O. Keohane, Introduction to TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD
POLITICS, at xi (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye eds., 1972).
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gree of institutionalized and hierarchical norms that have had
no historical precedent in the international system. Although
these international criminal tribunals were designed as selfcontained legal regimes, their jurisprudence has, nevertheless,
begun to be elevated into norms of customary international
law.3 Couple this phenomenon with the increasing rise and influence of other non-state transnational actors within the international system, and a complex picture of actors and institutions emerges. This article proposes that to understand the
new realities of the international system, one must turn to socio-legal studies (alternatively referred to as legal sociology or
law and society) and to the new groundbreaking work within
that field on norm formation, implementation, and interaction.
Socio-legal studies explore the effect of social forces on the
law.4 Rather than being interested solely in the internal rules
and doctrines that form a specific doctrinal body of law, sociolegal scholars instead look to how law can be, in part, a social
construction and, in this way, interact with wider historical,
institutional, and cultural forces within society.5 Socio-legal
scholarship has identified, with great precision, the emergence
of global norms and the causal mechanisms that accompany
their implementation. Most important amongst this scholarship (for the present conversation) is the work of Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers. Halliday and Carruthers have examined how global norms can be exchanged and transferred
between the transnational governmental, quasi-governmental,
and nongovernmental institutions within the international
community as a whole, and domestic states.6 According to Halliday and Carruthers, lawmaking and implementation, on both
the system (international) and national level, can act as an iterative and recursive process.7
3. For a detailed description of this phenomenon, see Roozbeh (Rudy) B.
Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old Challenges and
New Debates, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 173 (2010).
4. KITTY CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW & SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF REAL LAW 4 (2010).
5. Id. at 3–5.
6. See Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of
Law: Global Norm Making and National Law Making in the Globalization of
Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135 (2007); Terrence C. Halliday, Recursivity of Global Normmaking: A Sociolegal Agenda, 5 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 263 (2009).
7. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 6, at 1135–38.
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As Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg have noted, international law scholarship must move beyond normative debates
regarding its utility and instead evolve towards more empirical
work studying “the conditions under which international law is
formed and has effects.”8 With this guiding principle in mind,
this article will demonstrate how Halliday and Carruthers’
model of lawmaking and implementation as an iterative and
recursive process (“legal recursivity”) is a more apt description
of how, in a new international system dominated by normgenerating transnational actors, international norms both develop and operate.
Part I of this article will provide a brief overview on the general history of customary law and then move towards a more
specific discussion on the traditionally understood elements of
customary international law, state practice and opinio juris.
Part II presents a summary of the recent debates that have
taken place within the field of international law. Part III will
examine the current uncertainty rife within the field of international law over the role of state practice and opinio juris
within the customary element. It will then briefly survey and
discuss new theories of customary international law that have
emerged in order to try and address this uncertainty. Although
these new theories are both novel and original in their thinking, they all ultimately fail to offer either an empirically established or convincing picture of how international norms operate. Part IV will introduce the idea of “conceptual stretching”
from the social sciences, and demonstrate how a discussion and
understanding of this idea is key to overcoming the current
state of confusion within international law over the necessary
foundations of customary international law. “Conceptual
stretching” describes the distortions that result when established concepts are introduced to new cases without the required accompanying adaptation.9 A comprehension of how
“conceptual stretching” occurs, and the tools that can be utilized to overcome it, is key in understanding why the current
field of international law is in such an uncertain state. Part V
will demonstrate the weakness of the current conceptualization
8. See Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012).
9. See generally Giovanni Sartori, Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1033 (1970).
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of customary international law, one which holds state practice
and opinio juris as the main foundational elements of international custom. Part VI shall present a detailed introduction to
the idea of “legal recursivity” and demonstrate how, in an era
of norm-generating transnational actors, it presents a more logical and empirically rooted explanation of how norms develop
in the international system. This article will conclude with its
own modest suggestions of how future international law scholarship can, utilizing an approach that harnesses the theoretical
rigor of “legal recursivity” and the numerous empirical methods10 it lends itself to, move the field of international law forward.
I. CUSTOMARY LAW IN CONTEXT
Customary law has a long history in human culture and society. From the most primitive of societies, to the most advanced,
customary law has played a role in human development. From
detailed anthropological studies of tribal cultures, to more nuanced historical surveys of republican and later imperial Rome,
customary law has emerged as both a seemingly universal and
resilient human impulse.11 Evolving out of this heritage has
been customary international law, whose conceptualization has
traditionally firmly been rooted in the sources of its earlier,
mainly Roman, heritage.12 For example, although the Roman
law of the early Republic already recognized custom as a source
of law, many customary norms were later formally codified into
statutes.13
One of the questions that plagued early Roman jurists was
how usage could transform into a binding norm.14 The answer that emerged in Roman jurisprudence was the idea that
what transformed an observed practice into a binding obligation was a sense of legal obligation by those following the practice.15 This idea was encapsulated by the Latin maxim opinio
juris sive necessitates (an opinion of law or necessity), which
10. In this article, “methodology” is defined as “a concern with the logical
structure and procedure of scientific enquiry.” See Sartori, supra note 9, at
1033.
11. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 16–26 (2010).
12. See id. at 17–26.
13. Id. at 17–18.
14. Id. at 19.
15. Id.
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has come to be shortened to simply opinio juris.16 It is from this
early heritage that customary international law is traditionally
based. Renaissance scholars, most notably Francisco Suárez,
sought to place the study of the creation and development of
customary international norms away from the naturalist bent
of predecessors such as Hugo de Groot, and rather towards a
more positivist basis rooted in customary law with its associated elements of usage and opinio juris.17
Customary international law18 finds its source in the widespread consistent practice of states coupled with the belief (on
the part of the acting state) that they are acting out of a sense
of legal obligation or opinio juris.19 When enough of these
states act in a consistent manner, out of a sense of legal obligation, for a long enough period of time, a new customary international norm is said to be created.20 Much then, as was seen
in the earlier general discussion of customary law, states are in
effect creating a rule by acting in conformance to said rule over
a period of time out of a sense of some sort of legal obligation.
Accepted evidence of state practice and opinio juris has traditionally been taken to include domestic diplomatic correspondence and statements, domestic governmental reports and
statements, domestic legislation, and domestic judicial decisions.21 Customary international law is said to depend upon the
consent of nation states—and is thus, at least in the traditional
16. Id. at 20–21.
17. See id. at 138–43.
18. It should be noted here that international law traditionally comes in
two main forms, customary international law and the no less important treaty-based conventional international law. As the main topic of this article is
customary international law, conventional international law will only be
mentioned in passing.
19. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (7th ed. 1997); ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6–7 (2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
20. Note also that, in relation to conventional international law, multilateral treaties can transform into sources of customary international law, binding on all states in the international system, whether they are parties to the
particular treaty or not, if a large enough portion of non-signatory states in
the international system adhere to their provisions out of a sense of legal
obligation, i.e. opinio juris. See Baker, supra note 3, at 177.
21. MALANCZUK, supra note 19, at 39–40; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6–7 (7th ed. 2008).
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understanding presented here, very state-centric.22 As such, a
nation state that would not wish to be bound by a new rule of
customary international law could, in theory, vocally object and
announce to the international community of its fellow states
that it does not view itself as bound.23 This objection must be
consistently reiterated, lest it be lost.24
It is important to note that there are certain rules of customary international law considered so vital that they cannot be
contracted out of by individual states—such preemptory rules
are labeled jus cogens norms.25 Opinio juris plays a key role in
elevating a regular customary international norm into a jus
cogens norm,26 for only when the majority of states in the international system believe that a regular customary international norm cannot be persistently objected to, or contracted
out of, does this regular norm achieve elevation to jus cogens.27
Running parallel to jus cogens norms are what are called obligations erga omnes. Obligations erga omnes are obligations
considered so vital and important within the international system (usually in the form of jus cogens norms), that any state
(whether directly affected or not) may sue another state in or-

22. For example, if a rule of customary international law is emerging and
a nation state remains silent, then this can be seen as giving implicit consent
that the nation state will be bound by the new customary rule. See
MALANCZUK, supra note 19, at 43 (“Even silence on the part of states is relevant because passiveness and inaction with respect to claims of other states
can produce a binding effect creating legal obligations for the silent state[.]”).
23. See generally Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep.
116 (Dec. 18); RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 102, cmt. d.
24. MALANCZUK, supra note 19, at 46–48.
25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 53, 64, 71, May 23,
1969, 155 U.N.T.S. 331.
26. A list of generally recognized jus cogens norms include the right to selfdetermination as well as prohibitions against aggression, genocide, slavery,
racial discrimination, crimes against humanity, and torture. See Int’l Law
Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, Fifty-Third Session, art. 26, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001).
27. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESSES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HOW WE USE IT 22 (1995). Other commentators, however, depart from this
vision of jus cogens as a clear cut idea. See e.g. Karen Parker & Lyn Beth
Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 411, 414–16 (1989) (demonstrating the difficulty in determining the meaning of jus cogens through a discussion of the variety of definitions it has been given.).
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der to compel that the obligation be met.28 In this way obligations erga omnes can be seen as a determinant in questions
concerning jurisdiction and standing in international law.29
II. MODERN CUSTOM VERSUS TRADITIONAL CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although the terms “modern custom” and “traditional custom” to describe alternative interpretations of customary international law are recent,30 the debate itself between these two
viewpoints has existed throughout at least the past forty
years.31 At its core “modern custom” challenges “traditional
custom’s” reliance on the state practice prong in the test for
customary international norms.32 Instead, “modern custom”
seeks to de-emphasize state practice in exchange for a heightened reliance on opinio juris, and in this sense is more deductive in its logical reasoning where “traditional custom” is more
inductive.33 The emergence of these two alternative interpretations of customary international law has generated much debate within the field.
A. Modern Custom’s Counterpoint to Traditional Custom
Redrawing the role of state practice and opinio juris in the
formation of customary international law, adherents of “modern custom” have posited that, far from being a slow moving
cautious process, the formation of customary international
norms can be dynamic, with the possibility of occurring nearly overnight.34 The key proposition stressed by “modern cus28. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (New Application) (Belg.
v. Spain), Judgment, Second Phase, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 33–34 (Feb. 5).
29. YITIHA SIMBEYE, IMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 59–60
(2004).
30. The term first gained widespread use in the wake of Anthea Elizabeth
Robert’s influential article in the American Journal of International Law. See
Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757 (2001).
31. See Baker, supra note 3, at 178–84.
32. Roberts, supra note 30, at 758–59.
33. Id.
34. Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of State Practice in a Divided World,
in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 513, 531–32 (R. St. J.
Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983); Ted Stein, The Approach of a
Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International
Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457 (1985).
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tom” is that opinio juris alone formulates the foundational
source of customary international law.35 State practice is
viewed as an imprecise idea, with no exact model for the extent
and regularity of state practice needed for the formation of a
customary international norm.36 State practice, if it has any
role to play at all, is more a secondary factor in customary international norm formation,37 in that it can be thought of as
composed of a general acceptance rather than the expressed
will of individual states.38 Indeed, taking this view further, the
premise has been forwarded that it is impossible to determine
whether states in the international system are aware of their
obligations—for how can the attitudes and beliefs of a state
which is, after all, a collective political institution, be determined?39 Under this reasoning, international treaties, long held
to be a separate source of international law,40 have been held to
potentially generate customary international norms.41 The key
claim here by adherents of “modern custom” is that as long as
international treaties are, to a certain extent, widely ratified,
35. See Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant”
International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23 (1965); Cheng, supra
note 34, at 532; Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J.
INT’L L. 529, 546 (1993).
36. See MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES 156–
62 (1999).
37. Indeed, the International Court of Justice seemed to, in part, endorse
this point of view when, in the Nicaragua case, it relied more heavily on U.N.
resolutions and international treaties (in order to ascertain customary international rules on the use of force and principle of non-intervention) than on
actual state practice. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 98–107 (June 27).
38. See Alain Pellet, The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in International Law-Making, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 22, 37–46 (1992). There are,
however, contrary views to this line of reasoning within adherents of “modern
custom.” See, e.g., Hiram E. Chodosh, An Interpretive Theory of International
Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 973, 1052–56 (1995) (proposing 4/5 quorum of
states adopting a treaty provision before it could be elevated into a customary
norm).
39. ANTHONY D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
82–85 (1971).
40. See supra note 22.
41. D’AMATO, supra note 39, at 104, 110, 164; Louis B. Sohn, The International Law of Human Rights: A Reply to Recent Criticisms, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV.
347, 352–53 (1981); Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1129 (1982); Louis B. Sohn, “Generally Accepted” International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1076 (1986).

448

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 41:2

then the opinio juris that this wide ratification represents is
enough to seamlessly transform the treaty provisions (binding
on the signatories) into customary international law (binding
on all).42
B. Traditional Custom’s Response
“Modern custom” has provoked a serious response from
adherents of “traditional custom,” who have viewed the deemphasis of the coequal natures of state practice and opinio
juris in customary international norm formation with alarm.43
At its core, this critique argues that the reinterpretation of customary international law advocated by adherents of “modern
custom” poses a danger to the entire idea of customary international law.44 The critique continues that “modern custom,” in
its emulation of opinio juris over state practice, often reflects
aspirational goals rather than set standards,45 and as such reveals itself to be highly normative in nature.46
The interpretation of customary international law advocated
by the adherents of “modern custom” is, according to those who
oppose it, one that seeks to move the sources of customary international law (i.e. state practice and opinio juris) away from
their “practice-based” methodological orientation, and instead
employ methods which are more normative in nature.47 Adherents of “traditional custom” hold that international treaties or

42. Sohn, “Generally Accepted” International Rules, supra note 41, at
1077–78.
43. Although note that some scholars have characterized “traditional custom” as not viewing state practice and opinio juris as coequal but rather as
state practice as having precedence over opinio juris which is described as a
“secondary consideration.” See Roberts, supra note 30, at 758.
44. See, e.g., Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights
Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82,
83 (1989); Robert Y. Jennings, The Identification of International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, TEACHING AND PRACTICE 5 (Bin Cheng ed., 1982) (claiming that what adherents of “modern custom” elevate to customary international law is “not only not customary law: it does not even faintly resemble a
customary law”).
45. Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International
Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 110–12 (1995).
46. See generally Roberts, supra note 30, at 761–70.
47. G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
107-108 (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1983); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative
Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 425–26 (1983).
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resolutions of international bodies such as the United Nations
should be seen as possible starting points in the development of
international custom, not norm-generating acts in of themselves.48 Adherents of “traditional custom” claim that many of
the resolutions the U.N. General Assembly votes upon are aspirational in nature and are not intended to be embraced fully
and unconditionally by those states voting for them.49 Given
this point of fact, according to adherents of “traditional custom,” the act of using state practice and opinio juris together as
the yardsticks of custom formation, gains all the more importance, for only then can aspirational or symbolic acts be
separated from those intended to be lawmaking.50 As such, in
the absence of state practice, adherents of “traditional custom”
claim that anything labeled as a customary norm of international law lacks legitimacy.51
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS WITHIN CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The current state of international law is one of deep confusion over the role of state practice and opinio juris within the
customary element.52 The radically different interpretations of
state practice and opinio juris have led to uncertainty over
what the precise meanings of these two components of customary international law actually are. Ultimately the result has
been a gradual amalgamation of these two formerly distinct
ideas. New theories have emerged in an attempt to resolve the
uncertainty, but these new theories have proved inadequate,
and thus the confusion within the field remains.
48. Simma & Alston, supra note 44, at 89–90.
49. Thomas M. Franck, Appraisals of the ICJ’s Decision: Nicaragua v.
United States (Merits), 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 116, 119 (1987).
50. See, e.g., A. Mark Weisburd, American Judges and International Law,
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1475, 1505–06 (2003) (criticizing international law
scholars who, when purporting to make claims about what constitutes customary international law, do not refer to state practice).
51. See generally Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary International Law: The
Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1988). Contra Anthony
D’Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor Arthur A. Weisburd, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 459 (1988) (responding to Weisburd’s line of reasoning).
52. See, e.g., Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems, 15
EUR. J. INT’L L. 523 (2004).
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A. Uncertainty Over the Role of State Practice and Opinio Juris
The role of state practice and its relationship to opinio juris
in customary international norm formation has been the subject of much uncertainty in current scholarship. One key point
of confusion is whether state practice is a separate element in
customary international norm formation or rather folded into
opinio juris. The lack of clarity finds its source in the observation that for the state practice requirement to truly reflect that
which it purports to reflect (state practice), there must be a distinction made between those situations where a state has made
an affirmative claim (which would then count as state practice)
versus simple government statements (which would not count
as state practice)—the key stressed here is that affirmative
claims followed by action are very different things from statements that are not followed up by an act.53 The problem that
then arises, however, is what to do with the government statements—if they do not count as state practice, then how are
they to be classified? One problematic answer seems to be that
they can be thought of as possible evidence of opinio juris,54
which then has the potential of rendering the entire state practice/opinio juris divide as meaningless.55
Though the lack of clarity in what state practice must truly
reflect has contributed to the gradual amalgamation of the
53. See generally D’AMATO, supra note 39; H.W.A. THIRLWAY,
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
CONTINUING ROLE OF CUSTOM IN THE PRESENT PERIOD OF CODIFICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (1972); KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT
INTERNATIONAL LAW 42, 84 (2d ed. 1993). These views have been challenged
by other scholars who point out that customary international norms include
not only affirmative rules but also restrictions on certain conduct—as such
then what states do not do (omissions), and the reasons they provide for this,
can be just as important in ascertain state practice as overt acts. Given this,
what states say can indeed qualify as state practice. See MALANCZUK, supra
note 19, at 43.
54. See generally D’AMATO, supra note 39; Rein Müllerson, The Interplay of
Objective and Subjective Elements in Customary Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 161–64 (Karel Wellens ed., 1998); Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 RECUEIL DES COURS
155, 206 (1998) (cautioning, however, against treating affirmative government action as evidence of both state practice and opinio juris).
55. See, e.g., Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area (Canada v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 246, 299 (Oct. 12) (holding
that opinio juris could be confirmed by “the analysis of a sufficiently extensive and convincing practice, and not by deduction from preconceived ideas.”).
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former state practice/opinio juris divide, confusion over the exact meaning and parameters of opinio juris has also contributed to this problem. The confusion here stems from what some
scholars have labeled as the “opinio juris paradox.”56 The “opinio juris paradox” refers to the fact that if the idea refers to the
belief that a practice has already become a binding obligation,
then the initial belief in an emerging norm is always a mistaken one.57 How one views the implications of this paradox depends on whether opinio juris is seen as a law-creating fact or
as a law-distinguishing one.58 If opinio juris is a tool to distinguish between a mere usage or practice and a binding obligation, then the issue becomes moot.59 If however, opinio juris is
something more, then the “opinio juris paradox” becomes highly problematic. As scholars have researched and demonstrated,
international jurisprudence has issued conflicting and contradictory opinions that have at times supported both viewpoints—opinio juris as law creating and law distinguishing.60
The paradox matters because if opinio juris is a law creating
fact then it no longer can have a role independent of state practice.61
B. Do New Theories of Customary International Law Offer Possible Solutions?
The past several years have seen an exponential growth in
new theories designed to address the current confusion rife
within customary international law over the meaning and utility of its sources. Frederic Kirgis has suggested viewing state
practice and opinio juris as a single idea but along a “sliding

56. See Kammerhofer, supra note 52, at 534–35.
57. See Olufemi Elias, The Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary
International Law, 44 INT’L & COMP. LAW Q. 501, 502–03 (1995); Kammerhofer, supra note 52, at 534–35; BEDERMAN, supra note 11, at 149.
58. See generally Elias, supra note 57.
59. See e.g. MALANCZUK, supra note 19, at 45 (“Opinio juris is sometimes
interpreted to mean that states must believe that something is already law
before it can become law. However, that is probably not true; what matters is
not what states believe, but what they say. If some states claim that something is law and other states do not challenge that claim, a new rule will
come into being, even though all the states concerned may realize that it is a
departure from pre-existing rules.”).
60. See, e.g., Elias, supra note 57, at 506.
61. Id. at 508–10.
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scale.”62 The “sliding scale” refers to the idea that, in situations
where there is an excess of state practice, a great deal (if any)
opinio juris would not be required for the establishment of a
customary international norm.63 In situations where there is a
dearth of state practice, opinio juris would suffice for the establishment of a customary international norm.64 Moving away
from state practice and opinio juris as points of departure, Andrew T. Guzman has proposed viewing the compliance with
customary norms as a key factor in understanding the binding
character of customary international law.65 Utilizing a rational
actor model borrowed from economics, Guzman posits that
states value their international reputation (to the extent that it
allows them a stronger negotiating position vis-à-vis other
states) and that customary international norms emerge from
states judgments over whether (a) an international norm exists, and (b) if their international reputation (and hence future
negotiating position) will be harmed by a possible failure to
honor said norm.66 Taking a different approach, Brian D. Lepard, taking “modern custom” and its de-emphasis of state
practice in favor opinio juris as his starting point, has proposed
viewing customary international norms as having their source
in a belief in the desirability (on the part of states) of having
certain international norms (this would suffice as opinio juris);
which are then subsequently interpreted utilizing universally
recognized ethical principles.67
Though novel and original in their thinking, the new theories
of customary international law surveyed above all ultimately
fail to offer either an empirically established or convincing picture of how international norms operate. Though seemingly
62. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L L.
146 (1987).
63. Id. at 149.
64. Id.
65. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International
Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002).
66. Id. at 1840–51.
67. BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 8, 77–94 (2010). For a similar call to take ethical
principles into account in the formation of customary international norms,
see John Tasioulas, Customary International Law and the Quest for Global
Justice, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, HISTORICAL, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 307 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds., 2007).
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logical in its description of state practice and opinio juris as
single ideas along a “sliding scale,” Kirgis’s theory is hampered
by the fact that it keeps the amalgamation of state practice and
opinio juris as a single idea intact, thereby openly rendering
the “sliding scale” essentially meaningless, for without definite
distinctions between state practice and opinio juris, the “sliding
scale” can be gamed to offer whatever answer is normatively
desired.68 Guzman’s theory has the advantage of largely abandoning state practice and opinio juris and instead focuses on a
rational actor model. Conceiving customary international law
through a rational actor model, and in the process abandoning
the twin lenses of state practice and opinio juris, opens the
door to the use of empirical methods and at the same time sidesteps the problems associated with the collapse of the state
practice/opinio juris divide. The problem with Guzman’s theory, however, is that, as he himself readily admits, viewing state
compliance through a reputational lens limits the range of cases to which the theory applies, for in cases where the stakes are
high, states will theoretically look to their national interests.69
In this sense, Guzman’s conception of international law risks
ceding the entire field to the classical realist position within
international relations. Lepard’s theory is promising in that,
similar to Guzman, he largely abandons state practice and
opinio juris and thereby avoids falling into the conceptual
swamp that has emerged with their amalgamation as a single
idea. The key drawback of Lepard’s theory is that Lepard is not
empirically observing the international system and presenting
a theory for what empirically is occurring. He is instead making a normative argument for how customary international
norms ought to be conceptualized.70
IV. CONCEPTUAL STRETCHING AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW
“Conceptual stretching” is a term that originates from the social sciences and describes the distortions that result when es-

68. See Simma & Alston, supra note 44, at 96 (making a similar observation regarding Kirgis’s theory).
69. Guzman, supra note 65, at 1883–1886.
70. Such a normative track in international law is the very thing that
Prosper Weil famously argued against. See Weil, supra note 47.
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tablished concepts are introduced to new cases71 without the
required accompanying adaption. Understanding how “conceptual stretching” occurs, and the tools that can be utilized to
combat it, may offer a possible solution to the current state of
confusion within international law.
A. Conceptual Stretching Defined
First proposed and developed by social scientist Giovanni
Sartori, “conceptual stretching” refers to the distortions that
result when established concepts are introduced to new cases
without the required accompanying adaption.72 Sartori developed his ideas in response to the methodological problems that
had emerged in the social sciences as the range of phenomena
and institutions it concerned itself to study had expanded.73 As
social scientists undertook to compare these various phenomena, Sartori’s key concern was with what could happen when
established concepts were introduced to new cases without the
required adaption, for according to Sartori when this occurs,
“conceptual stretching” is very often the probable result.74
“Conceptual stretching” is problematic because it leads to “undefined conceptualizations” and “pseudo-equivalence.”75 For
example, take the example of a “rape” which, depending on
one’s jurisdiction, has a fairly well established set of attributes
(see Figure 1 below). If the concept of “rape” is stretched to
mean any form of “sexual assault” then the distinction itself
becomes meaningless and structured comparison and analysis
becomes impossible. The problem of “conceptual stretching”
does not mean that scholarship should shy away from comparing phenomena or run away from generalization, but it does
mean that scholars must be aware of the problem so that they
can then look to techniques to combat it.

71. A note for lawyers—“cases” here are defined as the “units of analysis in
a given study” and the “political, social, institutional, or individual entities or
phenomena about which information is collected and inferences are made.”
See Jason Seawright & David Collier, Glossary, in RETHINKING SOCIAL
INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS 315 (Henry E. Brady & David
Collier eds., 2d ed. 2010).
72. See generally Sartori, supra note 9.
73. Id. at 1034.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1035.
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To understand how concepts function, one must realize that
they are composed of two governing characteristics—intension
and extension.76 Intension refers to the assortment of properties, which assign meaning to the concept, while extension refers to the range of entities to which the concept can refer.77
The more general a concept is, the less intension it has and the
more extension; conversely, the more specific a concept is the
more intension it has and the less extension.78 Intension and
extension can be thought of existing along a continuum that
Sartori labels “the ladder of abstraction.”79 One can either
climb up the ladder and make a concept more abstract (through
reducing its intension but broadening its extension), or climb
down the ladder and make a concept less abstract (through
broadening its intension but reducing its extension).80 Intension can only be reduced through “diminishing its attributes or
properties” that are associated with a concept, and in the same
vein can only be broadened through augmenting the attributes
or properties associated with a concept.81 Observe the following
example:
Figure 1: Sartori’s Ladder of Abstraction
More Abstract (low intension, high extension)
(Example: Sexual Assault)
Attributes: -Unlawful Sexual Activity
-With a Person
Less Abstract (high intension, low extension)
(Example: Rape)
Attributes: -Unlawful Sexual Activity
-With a Person
-Without Consent
-Through Force or Threat of Injury

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Sartori, supra note 9, at 1041.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1040–41.
Id. at 1041.
Id.
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In the example illustrated in Figure 1, the more abstract concept (“sexual assault”) is associated with a smaller set of attributes, while the less abstract concept (“rape”) is associated
with a larger set of attributes. Intension here was reduced only
through the reduction of attributes (while in the same way it
was broadened only through the addition of attributes). The
problem of “conceptual stretching” emerges out of imprecise
definitions (and the mislabeling that results) that can then lead
to “pseudo-classifications” that make any generalization possible.82 Such imprecision can result from definitions (of concepts)
that are simply vague and under defined, but also emerge by
design out of attempts to make a concept more abstract (and
thus open to more comparisons across cases) without reducing
the intension. It is along these lines that Sartori counsels that
to avoid “conceptual stretching,” when climbing up/down the
ladder of abstraction, one should always keep in mind the attributes of the conceptualizations under study and diminish/augment them accordingly.
B. Customary International Law: A Concept that has Become
Conceptually Stretched?
The current conceptualization of customary international
law, relying as it does on the dual attributes of state practice
and opinio juris, is “conceptually stretched.” It is this fact that
has led to the rampant confusion in the field and opened the
door to a whole spectrum of contradictory generalizations.83
The debate between adherents of “modern custom” and those of
“traditional custom” has led to radically different interpretations of state practice and opinio juris, which have then worked
to lead to the gradual amalgamation of these two formerly distinct ideas. Part of the problem can be attributed to the fact
that customary international law suffers from a heavily statecentric bias that fails to take into account the very real effects
non-state forces, such as norm-generating transnational actors,
have on the international system. The attempt of “modern
custom” to de-emphasize state practice in favor of opinio
juris can perhaps be seen then as a way to broaden the array of actors that contribute to the development of interna82. Giovanni Sartori, Comparing and Miscomparing, 3 J. THEORETICAL
POL. 243, 248–49 (1991).
83. See supra Part III.
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tional norms but, shackled to the state-centric biases of international legal theory, “conceptual stretching” has been the only
result.
A possible solution to the chaos would be to move up Sartori’s
“ladder of abstraction.” By simplifying things and making the
object of study how norm formation operates, the discussion
can be extended beyond simply the nation state to instead include transnational actors. Through looking instead to more
sociological approaches of how norms develop, new and empirically testable frameworks for norm formation from the social
sciences can be introduced into the discussion. A possible outcome of this could be the following:
Figure 2: Customary International Norms up the Ladder of Abstraction
More Abstract (low intension, high extension)
(Concept: General Norm Formation)
Attributes: -The Physical Element
Less Abstract (high intension, low extension)
(Concept: Customary International Norm Formation)
Attributes: -The Physical Element (state practice)
-The Mental Element (opinio juris)
By moving up Sartori’s “ladder of abstraction” and focusing
on norm formation in general, distinct advantages emerge over
simply studying customary international law. The reduction of
intension allows for the simplification of the attributes associated with the new concept under study (general norm formation) and thus “conceptual stretching,” at least as related to
the concept of customary international law, can be avoided.
Additionally, the broadening of extension allows for the study
of a much broader group of phenomena. By making the object
of study how norm formation functions, on either the system
(international) or national level, the discussion can be extended
to include a range of hitherto excluded actors. Simple enough,
but aside from extending the objects of study beyond just state
actors, what distinguishes the framework above from simply an
inverse version of “modern custom” (i.e. de-emphasizing one
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prong of the traditional state practice/opinio juris formulation
in favor of the other)? As will be discussed in Part V below, part
of the difference here lies with the study of how exactly the
physical element gives rise to norms. How do state (and now
non-state) actors create norms through their binding action?
More specifically, in an era of norm generating transnational
actors, can the effects of such action be modelled empirically in
a sound, logical, and systematic way?
V. THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The birth of the U.N. gave rise to a new period within the international system, which saw the proliferation and growing
influence of transnational actors.84 Given this new reality, social scientists and especially international relations scholars
began to pay more attention to the role of these transnational
actors85 on the actions and behaviors of states within the international system. Though the approaches, methodologies, and
indeed conclusions of this scholarship have varied, one finding
has been universal—that transnational actors have a very real
role to play in both state behavior and the formation of international norms. This empirical scholarship can roughly be divided
into two categories, one which studies transnational actors on
the system (international) level, and another which opens up
the study to transnational actors on a national level.
A. Studies of Transnational Actors on the System Level
Studies of transnational actors on the system (international)
level focus on how large-scale international governmental and
nongovernmental organizations interact with states on the international level. The hallmark of this scholarship has been a
focus on how the presence and influence of transnational actors
within the international system affects the choices states make
and the behaviors they exhibit. Looking beyond the domestic
nation state, this scholarship studies how international institu84. For example, by 2006, there were roughly three hundred international
organizations and around forty international legal dispute settlement bodies
in the world, and these numbers, high as they are, mostly exclude nongovernmental advocacy groups. See José E. Alvarez, International Organizations:
Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 324, 325 (2006).
85. See discussion supra note 2.
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tions exert their own autonomous influence over the international system. Indeed, scholars of this school have directed
their attention to how the emerging international system of interlinked organizations and multilateral treaty regimes is exerting direct influence on the international system without any
mediation or filtration through domestic states.86 The new
“units of action” in these interactions are thus no longer domestic states but instead transnational actors who can either link
together different national interest groups within a related issue and assist them in coordinating their actions,87 or alternately create an environment where domestic state governments are unable to directly pursue their interests in a given
issue area alone and have to instead seek the assistance of the
same transnational actors and networks.88
Though varied in the methods employed and approaches taken to the study of transnational actors, the key similarity of all
of this scholarship has been its focus on how large scale international governmental and nongovernmental organizations interact with states on the international level. These findings
speak to the need to include transnational actors in any discussion of how international norms are formed.
B. Studies of Transnational Actors on the National Level
Studies of transnational actors on the national level focus on
how transnational social movements and advocacy groups try
to push their policy preferences and affect state behavior. The
86. See TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye eds., 1972); RICHARD MANSBACH, YALE FERGUSON &
DONALD LAMPERT, THE WEB OF WORLD POLITICS: NONSTATE ACTORS IN THE
GLOBAL SYSTEM (1976); HAROLD JACOBSON, NETWORKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (1979);
JAMES N. ROSENAU, THE STUDY OF GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE: ESSAYS ON THE
TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF WORLD AFFAIRS (1980); PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE
GLOBAL SYSTEM: THE TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS OF ISSUE-ORIENTATED NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (Peter Willetts ed., 1982); Baker, supra note
3.
87. See Nye & Keohane, supra note 2, at xviii–xix; MANSBACH, FERGUSON &
LAMPERT, supra note 86, at 41–45; JACOBSON, supra note 86, at 14–19, 398–
414; ROSENAU, supra note 86, at 1–2.
88. See Nye & Keohane, supra note 2, at xix–xx; JACOBSON, supra note 86,
at 416–422; Peter Willetts, Introduction to PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE GLOBAL
SYSTEM: THE TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS OF ISSUE-ORIENTATED NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 21–22, 186–187 (Peter W. Willetts ed., 1982).
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hallmark of this scholarship has been its focus on the tools and
processes these transnational actors utilize in order to attempt
to affect state behavior and how international norms begin to
emerge as a result. Early analysis within this scholarship (in
the years immediately following the Second World War) was
conducted on such widespread issue areas as the ability of
states to shape or sabotage the creation of multilateral treaty
regimes;89 the effect of international organization membership
on both the foreign policy of its member states90 and on fostering the organic emergence of collective security arrangements
between various member states;91 and the ability of international organizations to target and lobby national legislatures.92
The findings of this early research pointed to the sometimes
unique abilities of international organizations to affect behavioral change on the domestic level.93 Later, more contemporary
analysis within this scholarship has sought to study not only
specific transnational actors and their ability to affect domestic
state behavior, but to go beyond and study “networks” of such

89. See generally Virginia Little, Control of International Air Transport, 3
INT’L ORG. 274 (1949).
90. See generally Benjamin V. Cohen, The Impact of the United Nations on
United States Foreign Policy, 5 INT’L ORG. 29 (1951); Wytze Gorter, GATT
After Six Years: An Appraisal, 8 INT’L ORG. 1 (1954); E.B. Matecki, Establishment of the International Finance Corporation: A Case Study, 10 INT’L
ORG. 261 (1956).
91. See generally Howard C. Johnson & Gerhart Niemeyer, Collective Security: The Validity of an Ideal, 8 INT’L ORG. 19 (1954).
92. See generally A. Glenn Mower, The Official Pressure Group of the
Council of Europe’s Consultative Assembly, 18 INT’L ORG. 292 (1964);
ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE: DECISION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
(Robert W. Cox et al. eds., 1973).
93. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 90 at 275–80 (Where the author discusses
how the U.N., through simply existing as a forum for the potential resolution
of disputes, actually exerted influence on the foreign policy decision-making
of its member states.); Gorter, supra note 90, at 7–9 (finding that the specific
institutional structures of international institutions can directly affect their
ability to influence the actions of their members.); Matecki, supra note 90, at
266–73 (finding that the support for the creation of the International Finance
Corporation in the mid-1950s by the United States was a direct result of lobbying efforts by members of other international institutions.); Mower, supra
note 92, at 292–94 (finding that that international organizations can have the
very clear capacity to specifically lobby national legislatures when the need
arises.).
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actors bound together by shared goals and values.94 This scholarship has presented a fairly unified framework that first emphasized how both international forces and national level institutions could affect the ability of transnational actors to affect
policy change,95 and then later sought to refine it by evolving
this static view of transnational behavior towards targeted
states into a more fluid one (i.e. where the efforts of transnational actors within targeted states are a back and forth affair
rather than a single one-shot attempt).96
94. See BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS,
DOMESTIC STRUCTURES, AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (Thomas RisseKappen ed., 1995); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS
BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998);
THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE
(Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999);
RESTRUCTURING WORLD POLITICS: TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,
NETWORKS, AND NORMS (Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 2002).
95. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, Introduction to BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL
RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES, AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 3 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995).
96. See, e.g., KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 94, at 12–16. By building on
Risse-Kappen’s original 1995 framework, Keck and Sikkink create a model
that they label as the “boomerang pattern.” Id. This model envisions a world
where domestic advocacy groups can activate transnational advocacy networks who will then, through issue framing and motivating collective action,
put pressure on other domestic states and relevant international organizations. Id. See also, e.g., Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization
of Human Rights Norms, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1 (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn
Sikkink eds., 1999) Building on both the original framework offered by RisseKappen and Keck and Sikkink’s “boomerang pattern,” id. at 4–5, the authors
create a “spiral model” that envisions a world where, much like that in the
“boomerang effect,” domestic advocacy groups can activate their transnational advocacy network that will then motivate collective action. Id. at 17–20.
Where the two models differ is that the “spiral model” views the process as
much more fluid, with the targeted state making first blanket denials, later
tactical concessions, and finally rule consistent behavior. Id. The key in the
back and forth is that each stage can result in the targeted state becoming
“socialized” by conforming to preferred behaviors and norms. Id. Yet another
group of scholars envision a world where transnational actors affect change
in the international system either through taking well established “international norms” and using them to “persuade” outlying actors to conform their
behavior, or attempting to establish new “international norms” where none
had previously existed in a back and forth process. Sanjeev Khagram, James
V. Riker & Kathryn Sikkink, From Santiago to Chile: Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics, in RESTRUCTURING WORLD POLITICS:
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Through utilizing diverse methods and approaches to the
study of transnational actors, the key similarity of all of this
scholarship has been its focus on how transnational social
movements and advocacy groups try to push their policy preferences and affect state behavior, and how international norms
can then begin to emerge as a result. A key consistency of this
scholarship has been its exploration of the tools transnational
actors utilize in order to attempt to affect state behavior, and
the seeming suggestion that at least some of these processes
are iterative in nature. These findings speak to the need to include transnational actors in any discussion of how international norms are formed.
VI. TOWARD A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK: LEGAL RECURSIVITY AND
NORM FORMATION
Given the “conceptually stretched” nature of the current conceptualization of customary international law, a new framework for thinking about international norm formation is needed. This framework, in keeping to climbing up Sartori’s “ladder
of abstraction” must look to general norm formation as its point
of departure. As shall be seen, the model of “legal recursivity”
points the way forward.
A. Legal Recursivity
Legal sociologists Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers
have examined how norms can be exchanged and transferred
between the transnational governmental, quasi-governmental,
and nongovernmental institutions within the international
community as a whole, and domestic states. According to Halliday and Carruthers, lawmaking and implementation, on both
the system (international) and national level, can act as an iterative and recursive process.97 International actors such as
states, but also transnational quasi and nongovernmental institutions, develop legal norms that are then refracted into domestic states through exogenous processes such as economic
coercion, persuasion through international institutions, and
universal norms (that can then act as models to domestic states
on what constitutes acceptable behavior within the internaTRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, NETWORKS, AND NORMS 3, 3–4, 11–16
(Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 2002).
97. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 6, at 1135–38.
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tional system).98 These norms can then undergo recursive cycles, on both the national and international level, as formal law
(the law on the books) goes through cycles of change as it is interpreted and implemented (the law in practice),99 refracting
back and forth between the international system and national
systems.100 That these recursive cycles will occur is not a given,
nor will these cycles necessarily occur in perpetuity,101 rather
they are driven by four distinct identifiable mechanisms: (1)
the indeterminacy of law (the ambiguities inherent in statutes,
regulations, and court opinions that leads to the possible unintended consequences of their application, setting off repeated
rounds of redrafting and reapplication)102; (2) contradictions
(the phenomenon that emerges ideologically when clashing visions amongst actors leads to imperfect legal settlements, or
institutionally when legal implementation is divided out between different institutions)103; (3) diagnostic struggles (the
struggle, between various actors, of diagnosing perceived shortcomings in legal norms and identifying corrective prescriptions)104; and (4) actor mismatch (mismatches that occur when
there is a disparity between actors who actually participate in
the norm-making process in a particular issue area, and those
who the norms actually effect—in other words actors whom are
98. Id. at 1146–48.
99. “Legal recursivity,” following classic socio-legal theory, holds that the
“conditions of lawmaking affect implementation, and the circumstances of
practice influence what law gets placed on the books.” See Halliday, supra
note 6, at 269.
100. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 6, at 1144, 1146–47. For an earlier
exploration of this phenomenon in the national setting, see Lauren Edelman,
Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil
Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992); Lauren Edelman, Legality and the
Endogeneity of Law, in LEGAL AND COMMUNITY: ON THE INTELLECTUAL
LEGACY OF PHILIP SELZNICK 187 (Robert A. Kagan, Martin Krygier & Kenneth
Winston eds., 2002).
101. Halliday, supra note 6, at 274.
102. Id. at 281–282; Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 6, at 1149.
103. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 6, at 1149–50; Halliday, supra note
6, at 280–81. There is also vast literature in public law on ideological contradiction, especially as related to the interactions between the U.S. Congress
and the Federal Courts. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994); R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING
WELFARE RIGHTS (1994).
104. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 6, at 1150–51; Halliday, supra note
6, at 278–79.
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directly affected by a new norms implementation are not participants in its creation)105. “Legal recursivity” conceptualizes
norm-making as, above all else, an “exercise of power” and a
“struggle among competing actors in global arenas.”106 Normmaking has a beginning (time 1) when there are competing
claims and conflicts and an end (time 2) when behavior and expectations have become “routinized, orderly, and predictable”
by accepted and therefore authoritative norms.107 Recursive
cycles are what occur between time 1 and time 2.
Figure 3: Legal Recursivity in Action108

105. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 6, at 1150–51; Halliday, supra note
6, at 277–78.
106. Halliday, supra note 6, at 268–69.
107. Id. at 274.
108. Figure replicates Figure 1 provided in Halliday, supra note 6, at 270.
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B. The Advantages of Legal Recursivity
Through their detailed description of the causal mechanisms
and processes of norm formation and implementation, Halliday
and Carruthers’ work on “legal recursivity” is exceptional in
offering a true blueprint for examining the methods through
which international and national norms interact. Additionally,
“legal recursivity” fits well into the literature surveyed earlier
detailing the empirical work done on the effects of transnational actors in the formation of international norms,109 for it provides an overarching framework that describes the constant
formation, reformation, and refinement of international and
national level norms, and the causal mechanisms that drive
this process both within and between the two levels (international and national).110 As Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg
have rightly noted, international law scholarship must go beyond normative debates regarding its utility and instead move
toward more empirical work studying “the conditions under
which international law is formed and has effects.”111 “Legal
recursivity” meets this challenge by being open to a whole
range of qualitative (observational) quasi-experimental112 research designs and methods, including: ethnographic analy-

109. See supra Part V.
110. Much of the literature surveyed earlier in Part V, though rich in theoretical insight, was somewhat inadequate in detailing the causal mechanisms
that drove the relationships investigated.
111. See Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 1.
112. The term “quasi-experimental” was first coined by social scientist Donald Campbell in order to describe research environments where the researcher in question could not meet the requirements of an experimental research
design (i.e. specifically isolate the variables under study or randomly manage
the assignment of causes to units). Though these requirements were fairly
easy to implement in the hard science world of controlled laboratories, in the
soft social science world of studying social phenomena in uncontrolled environments they became next to impossible. In such situations, Campbell cautioned researchers to adopt “quasi-experimental” designs where they would
strive, to the extent possible, to replicate the control (over the variables under
study) found in experimental designs and, most importantly, also be aware
that their “quasi-experimental” designs would suffer from imprecise models
and partial data. See generally DONALD T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. STANLEY,
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH (1966); see
also Donald T. Campbell & H. Laurence Ross, The Connecticut Crackdown on
Speeding: Time Series Data in Quasi-Experimental Analysis, 1 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 33 (1968).
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sis,113 comparative analysis,114 case study analysis,115 and process tracing.116
“Legal recursivity” is not only especially well-suited to overcome the measurement problems inherent to any quasiexperimental research design,117 but to also provide the “thick”
descriptive insight that only observational methods can provide
because it (a) is systematic in its approach through its focus on
a constantly reoccurring set of dynamics; (b) introduces hypotheses related to the actors and mechanisms that can drive
normmaking;118 (c) identifies beginnings (time 1) and endings
(time 2) in recursive cycles of norm-making; (d) is historical in
outlook and takes contingent changes in institutions, based on
shifts in time, seriously;119 and (e) is comparative and indeed
113. Ethnographic analysis involves continuous direct observation and possible interaction of the group(s) under study. See KAREN O’REILLY,
ETHNOGRAPHIC METHODS (2005).
114. The comparative method involves the comparison and subsequent
analysis of a set of cases. Through a systematic set of comparisons made between sets of cases, the effect of various differences across the cases under
study can then be gauged. See ADAM PRZEWORSKI & HENRY TEUNE, THE LOGIC
OF COMPARATIVE SOCIAL INQUIRY (1970); David Collier, The Comparative
Method, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE II 106 (Ada W.
Finifter ed., 1993).
115. The case study method involves the intense study of single case and
serves as a useful methodological vehicle for studies looking to test and refine
theories. The detailed descriptive analysis it demands can serve to provide for
the observation of potential causal interactions between identified variables.
See generally Arent Lijphart, Comparative Politics and the Comparative
Method, 65 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 682 (1971); John Gerring, What is a Case
Study and What is it Good For?, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 341 (2004).
116. Process tracing is a method designed, in part, to identify the “causal
process” or “causal chain” between independent and dependent variables.
This is achieved through the systematic mapping of the “explanatory narrative” until the position where the relationships between the various variables
can be identified. This can be undertaken through a detailed narrative, generalization, or an analytic explanation. See ANDREW BENNETT & ALEXANDER
GEORGE, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
(2005).
117. See, e.g., discussion supra note 112.
118. In this way “legal recursivity” corrects a key flaw in international law
“theory,” the lack of any clear or accepted overarching theoretical framework.
See Kammerhofer, supra note 52, at 536–51.
119. By taking time and historical processes seriously, “legal recursivity” is
compatible with historical institutionalist approaches. Historical institutionalism is “neither a particular theory nor a specific method,” instead it is a
process or “approach to studying politics and social change” (with the associ-
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encourages comparisons across issue areas and levels of analysis.120
Figure 4: Legal Recursivity and the Mechanisms that Drive It
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ated method most often used to study this change being the case study). This
process is different from others because in looking to answer empirical questions, it focuses on both the historical orientation and trajectory of institutions, and how they can change and shape behavior. Institutions then are not
classic independent or explanatory variables, but rather act as mediators or
filters shaping the effects of other independent variables (whatever they may
be). History itself becomes a methodological tool of analysis, with institutions
become the main units of said analysis. See, e.g., STRUCTURING POLITICS:
HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen & Frank Longstreth eds., 1992); Evan S. Lieberman, Causal Inference in Historical Institutional Analysis: A Specification of Periodization
Strategies, 34 COMP. POL. STUD. 1011 (2001); Sven Steinmo, Historical Institutionalism, in APPROACHES AND METHODOLOGIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: A
PLURALIST PERSPECTIVE 118 (Donatella della Porta & Michael Keating eds.,
2008).
120. Halliday, supra note 6, at 269.
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C. Legal Recursivity and International Norm Formation: A
Comparative Case Study (Crimes Against Humanity)
The emergence of “crimes against humanity” as a specific international offense has been fairly recent, starting only in the
beginning of the twentieth century and developing in earnest
in the years immediately following the end of the Second World
War. An analysis of the origins and development of crimes
against humanity that takes legal recursivity as its starting
point, thereby abandoning the traditional approach that has
looked to how this offense emerged from its treaty based origins and developed as a customary international norm, has
many advantages. The most important of these advantages is
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that such a point of departure makes sense of how the initial
burst of activity around the doctrinal development of the offense in the immediate years following the end of the Second
World War soon came to an end, ushering in a nearly forty-year
freeze. A freeze that only expired in the early 1990s, with the
establishment of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) by the
U.N. Security Council, and the later related emergence (by
treaty) of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). It
would be these more recent developments that would contribute to crimes against humanity’s status as a doctrine of international criminal law under constant recursive cycles of refinement and interpretation—a process that is currently still
ongoing.
1. Overview
The origin of “crimes against humanity” as a specific international crime can be first traced to the Hague Peace Conferences
of 1899 and 1907. Both of these international conferences had
been proposed by the great powers of the day to negotiate the
conduct of nations in war. Both conferences resulted in a set of
international treaties/conventions (the Hague Conventions)121
that served as one of the first international attempts to codify
what behavior was acceptable/unacceptable by nations during
warfare.122 In 1919, with the conclusion of the First World War,
the victorious Allied Powers established the Commission on the
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties (the “Commission”) to explore the actions of the defeated Central Powers during the conflict. The Commission
recommended that a tribunal be established to judge all members of the defeated Central Powers found to have violated the
“laws of humanity.”123 “Laws of humanity” were defined broadly by the Allied Powers as offenses that the Central Powers had
121. The Hague Conference of 1899 resulted in three international treaties,
while the Conference of 1907 resulted in thirteen.
122. See Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of
Warfare on Land, pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803; Hague Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277.
123. Comm’n on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, Rep. Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference,
Mar. 29, 1919, reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95 (1920).
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committed against their own citizens.124 Ultimately, the Commission’s recommendation to establish a tribunal was rejected,
with the main country leading the charge being the United
States, which argued that the standards for judging violations
of the “laws of humanity” were uncertain and unclear.125
Although the United States had been opposed to establishing
a tribunal to judge violations of the “laws of humanity” in the
wake of the First World War, its attitude would change radically at the close of the Second World War in 1945.126 It was at
this point that the United States became one of the key advocates for the establishment of an international tribunal to try
members of the defeated Nazi regime for, amongst other
things, offenses against its own citizens.127 The tribunal that
was initially established, the International Military Tribunal
(IMT) set in Nuremberg to try leading Nazi officials, did much
to contribute to the development of crimes against humanity as
a specific international offense. Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter
defined crimes against humanity as “murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts . . . or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds” committed
against a civilian population in the context of an armed conflict.128 The importance of Article 6(c) lay in the fact that it
“was the first international instrument to define crimes against
humanity as a positive crime punishable under international
law.”129 As such, the IMT Charter set the trajectory of the doctrinal development of crimes against humanity as a specific international offense. The importance of the IMT Charter would
remain in the decades following the Second World War as Article 6(c); in the absence of any other major international treaty
or convention defining the parameters of crimes against hu-

124. Id. at 121–23.
125. Am. Comm’s to Negotiate Peace, Memorandum of Reservations presented by the Reps. of the United States to the Rep. of the Comm’n on Responsibilities, Apr. 4, 1919, reprinted in General Records of the Am. Comm’n to
Negotiate Peace 1918–1931, PPC Doc. F.W.181.12302/7.
126. GIDEON BOAS, JAMES L. BISCHOFF & NATALIE L. REID, ELEMENTS OF
CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 21–23 (2008).
127. Id.
128. See Charter of the Int’l Military Tribunal, art 6(c).
129. BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra note 126, at 20. See also William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 767, 772–75 (1999).
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manity, the IMT Charter would remain one of the main defining guides to this developing international criminal offense.
In 1947, building on the aftermath of the IMT Charter and
the trial of leading Nazi leaders, the U.N. established the International Law Commission (ILC) partly in order to bring together and codify international law—including the then developing offense of crimes against humanity.130 In Article 2(11) of
the first Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind that the ILC published in 1954, the language of
Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter defining crimes against humanity as “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other inhumane acts . . . or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds” was kept,131 but the armed conflict requirement was modified and replaced with a requirement that
crimes be committed under the “instigation or toleration” of
state authorities.132 After 1954, the doctrinal development of
crimes against humanity on the international level slowed
down to a virtual standstill,133 with much of this paralysis attributable to the fact that the ILC took nearly forty years to
debate and come up with a final Draft Code in 1996.134 Indeed,
the 1996 Draft Code itself relied heavily on another set of international developments that had occurred several years earlier in 1993 and 1994, the establishment of the ad hoc ICTY
and ICTR.135
130. See G.A. Res. 174 (II), Establishment of an International Law Commission (Nov. 21, 1947).
131. The text of the 1954 ILC Draft Code specifically read “The following
acts are offenses against the peace and security of mankind: . . . Inhuman
acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or persecutions, committed against any civilian population on social, political, racial,
religious or cultural grounds . . . .” See Draft Code of Offenses Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N art. 2(11) (1954) [hereinafter Draft Code of Offenses].
132. Id. Some scholars have been highly critical of the 1954 ILC Draft Code
as neither fully following the IMT Charter in its modification of the armed
conflict requirement nor fully breaking with it either.
133. BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra note 126, at 28–29. Though note that
during this period there were a number of national level trials for crimes
against humanity.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 29–30 (“[T]he 1996 Draft Code’s definition of crimes against
humanity resembles that of the ad hoc Tribunals as developed in their jurisprudence—most notably in that the punishable conduct must be committed,
as the ILC draft puts it, ‘in a systematic manner or on a large scale.’”).

474

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 41:2

The nearly forty-year freeze in the doctrinal development of
crimes against humanity came to an end in the early 1990s
with the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR by the U.N. Security Council, in order to judge serious breaches of international law committed in the conflicts taking place in the former
Yugoslavia136 and Rwanda,137 and the related promulgation of a
final ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind in 1996.138 While the ICTY and ICTR were not
tasked with “making” international criminal law,139 but rather
only with applying it, it was inevitable that their establishment
would have a deep effect on the development of certain international offenses, especially those such as crimes against humanity that were not very well defined at the time.140
The ICTY Statute, which came out in 1993, followed in the
footsteps of Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter, requiring that any
listed crimes against humanity be committed in the context of
an armed conflict.141 This armed conflict requirement, whilst
keeping with Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter, went against the
post-IMT Charter trials of lesser Nazi officials that had been
conducted by the Allied Powers outside of the IMT Charter regime under Control Council Law No. 10 (where no armed con-

136. See S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
137. See S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
138. See Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N pt. 2 (1996) [hereinafter Draft Code of Offenses
(1996)].
139. See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(May 3, 1993). In regards to the establishment of the ICTY, the U.S. Secretary General stated “the Security Council would not be creating or purporting
to ‘legislate’ the law. Rather, the International Tribunal would have the task
of applying existing international . . . law.” Id.
140. See BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra note 126, at 26–31; Baker, supra
note 3, at 185. See generally Christopher Greenwood, The Development of
International Humanitarian Law by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, in 2 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 97 (Jochen
A. Frowein & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 1998); William Schabas, Customary Law
or “Judge-Made” Law: Judicial Creativity at the UN Criminal Tribunals, in
THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF PROFESSOR IGOR BLISHCHENKO 77 (José Doria, Hans-Peter Gasser
& M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 2009).
141. S.C. Res. 827, art. 5 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter Statute for the Int’l
Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia].
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flict requirement had been present),142 and against the 1954
ILC Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind which, as mentioned earlier, had replaced the armed
conflict requirement of the IMT Charter with a requirement
that crimes need only be committed under the “instigation or
toleration” of state authorities.143 The ICTR Statute, which
came out one year after its ICTY counterpart, took the approach of Control Council Law No. 10 and the 1954 ILC Draft
Code, by not requiring that the listed crimes against humanity
be committed in the context of an armed conflict—the ICTR
Statute instead required that the listed crime against humanity need only be committed “on national, political, ethnic, racial
or religious grounds.”144 The 1996 ILC Draft Code also mirrored
the ICTR approach by not containing an armed conflict requirement, but only required that listed crimes against humanity be committed under the instigation of state authorities145—
there was no requirement for such crimes to be committed “on
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds” as there
had been in the ICTR Statute.
Though they differed on whether an armed conflict was a
necessary element for the commission of a crime against humanity, both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes took identical approaches
in defining crimes against humanity as consisting of the following acts (first enumerated in Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter
and Article 2(11) of the 1954 ILC Draft Code): murder, exter142. The trial of lesser Nazi officials (i.e., outside of the main civilian and
military leadership) was conducted by the Allied Powers outside of the IMT
Charter regime under Control Council Law No. 10 (which provided for trials
by military tribunal of the individual Allied Powers). It should be noted, however, that although Control Council Law No. 10 did not contain the requirement that crimes against humanity be committed in the context of an armed
conflict, the majority of jurisprudence of the trials held under Control Council
Law No. 10 still required the link. See BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra note
126, at 24–26.
143. Draft Code of Offenses, supra note 131, art. 2(11).
144. S.C. Res. 955, art. 3 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Statute for the Int’l
Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda]. The ICTR Statute also required that a listed
crime against humanity be committed “as part of a widespread or systematic
attack.” Although the ICTY Statute originally did not contain this additional
provision, it was later incorporated into the Statute through case law. See
Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 85 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June
12, 2002).
145. Draft Code of Offenses (1996), supra note 138, art. 18.
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mination, enslavement, deportation, persecutions on political,
racial and religious grounds, and other inhumane acts.146 To
this existing list, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes also then added
the additional acts of: imprisonment, torture, and rape.147 The
1996 ILC Draft Code closely followed this approach but expanded the definitions of rape and other inhumane acts, and
then added the additional acts of institutionalized discrimination and the forced disappearance of persons.148 Contributions
from their Statutes aside, ICTY and ICTR also contributed to
the doctrinal development of crimes against humanity through
their extensive jurisprudence.149 This jurisprudence established
the general requirements for a listed act to qualify as a crime
against humanity,150 and provided detailed guidance of the required mental (mens rea) and physical (actus reus) elements151
each act requires.152 The experiences and lessons learned from
146. Statute for the Int’l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra
note 141, art. 5; Statute for the Int’l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note
144, art. 3.
147. Statute for the Int’l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra
note 141, art. 5; Statute for the Int’l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda supra note
144, art. 3.
148. Draft Code of Offenses (1996), supra note 138, art. 18.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 139, 140.
150. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., supra note 144, at ¶ 85 (Where the
ICTY Appeals Chamber listed the following elements that had to be present
for a listed act under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute to qualify as a crime
against humanity: an attack, perpetrator(s) must be part of the attack, attack
must be directed against a civilian population, attack must be widespread or
systematic, and perpetrator(s) must be aware that there is a pattern of widespread or systematic attacks against the particular civilian population and
intend for their attack to fit into this pattern.).
151. Under both “civil,” or inquisitorial legal systems and “common,” or accusatorial ones, all crimes, at their base, require two elements: (1) the mental
guilty mind, or mens rea, and (2) the physical guilty act, or actus reus. See,
e.g., JEAN PRADEL, MANUEL DE DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL 436–38. (9th ed. 1994);
ZORAN STOJANOVI#, KRIVI!NO PRAVO, OPŠTI DEO 111–17, 162–64 (1st ed. 2000);
RICHARD CARD, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.1 (15th ed. 2001); WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW §§ 5.1, 6.1 (3d ed. 2010).
152. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. [!elebići], Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 439 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Nov. 16, 1998) (discussing some of the elements required for the act of murder to qualify as a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case
No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 227–29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2002) (elements required for the act of extermination to qualify as a crime against humanity.); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case
No. IT-97-25-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 350 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
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the work of the ICTY and ICTR would directly affect how
crimes against humanity would be defined in the Rome Statute
of the ICC in 1998, which contains, to date, the most recent international iteration on crimes against humanity as an international offense.153 The Rome Statute’s approach to defining
crimes against humanity would differ in several key points
from the ICTY and ICTR approaches. Indeed, an analysis of
the debates and disputes during the drafting of Article 7 of the
Rome Statute (governing crimes against humanity) reveals a
complex picture.
Whether to include an armed conflict requirement (as contained in the ICTY Statute, but absent from the ICTR Statute
and 1996 ILC Draft Code) for crimes against humanity in Article 7, was a key debating point amongst the delegates to the
Rome Conference.154 Ultimately, the requirement was dropped
from Article 7 (placing it more in line with the treatment of
crimes against humanity in the ICTR Statute and 1996 ILC
Draft Code). The prevailing side was of the opinion that customary international law155 no longer required that crimes
against humanity be committed in the context of an armed con-

Former Yugoslavia Mar. 25, 2002) (elements required for the act of enslavement to qualify as a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No.
IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 278 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006) (elements required for the act of deportation to qualify as a crime against humanity.); Prosecutor v. Kordić & !erkez,
Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 302–03 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001) (elements required for the act of
imprisonment to qualify as a crime against humanity.); Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 495
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001) (elements required
for the act of torture to qualify as a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v.
Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 131 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004) (elements required for the act
of persecution to qualify as a crime against humanity.); Prosecutor v. Kordić
& !erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 117 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004) (elements required for
other inhumane acts to qualify as a crime against humanity.).
153. In 1998, an international treaty was adopted establishing a permanent
ICC to judge serious breaches of international criminal law. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
154. BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra note 126, at 105–06.
155. See supra Part I for a discussion and explanation of the traditionally
held sources of customary international law: state practice and opinio juris.
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flict, and that the inclusion of such a requirement could create
“an unnecessary burden for prosecutions.”156 Though the view
that crimes against humanity no longer required a nexus to an
armed conflict prevailed at the Rome Conference, there was a
significant minority on the losing end of the argument (mainly
amongst the African, Arab, and Asian delegations) that felt
customary international law still required the nexus,157 and
this view, although a minority one, is certainly not without its
adherents.158
Another point of debate over Article 7 of the Rome Statute
involved the acts that would be defined as crimes against humanity. Both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes had contained identical exhaustive lists which the Rome Statute replicates, but
with two key differences. The first difference centers on the act
of persecution, which the ICTY and ICTR Statutes stated could
be committed on “political, racial, or religious grounds.”159 Article 7 of the Rome Statute keeps this wording but then adds
that persecution can also be committed on national, ethnic, cultural, or gender grounds or any “other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.”160
This broader definition had been the subject of an intense debate between various state delegations—with some of the delegations arguing for an expansive list defining the grounds under which persecution could qualify as a crime against humani156. See BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra note 126, at 105–06.
157. See Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS
AND RESULTS 94 n. 43 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). See also Stuart Ford, Crimes
Against Humanity at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia:
Is a Connection with Armed Conflict Required?, 24 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 125,
129–32 (2007) (describing the debates that occurred, in the years following
the end of World War II, over whether crimes against humanity in customary
international law still required the armed conflict nexus).
158. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA, AND SIERRA LEONE 187–88
(2006) (discussing how the probable explanation for the ICTY Statute’s inclusion of the armed conflict requirement for crimes against humanity in 1993
was the U.N. Secretary General’s view that to not have done so would have
violated the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (the prohibition on the creation of any ex post facto law to the disadvantage of the accused)).
159. Statute for the Int’l Criminal Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 141, art. 5(h); Statute for the Int’l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda,
supra note 144, art. 3(h).
160. Rome Statute, supra note 153, art. 7(1)(h).
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ty, others arguing for more illustrative list.161 Yet others still
arguing that persecution be removed as an act that could qualify as a crime against humanity altogether.162 Ultimately, those
arguing for a more expansive list won out, though this approach has not been without criticism.163 The second difference
between the ICTY/ICTR Statutes and the Rome Statute relates
to the two new additional acts that the Rome Statute added to
the list already established by the ICTY and ICTR—these two
new acts being enforced disappearance and apartheid.164 The
inclusion of enforced disappearance and apartheid as acts that
could qualify as crimes against humanity was mainly at the
insistence of the Latin American and African delegations respectively,165 and was later criticized by some scholars as being
well outside the understood parameters of crimes against humanity under customary international law.166

161. See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 157, at 101.
162. See Rep. of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Vol. I, ¶ 99 U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996).
163. See Antonio Cassese, Crimes Against Humanity, in 1 THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 376–77
(Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002) (Where the
author criticizes the expansive definition of persecution in Article 7(h) of the
Rome Statute as well beyond the standard under customary international
law.).
164. See Rome Statute, supra note 160, arts. 7(1)(i), 7(1)(j). Technically
speaking, there were actually more than two new additional acts (that could
be qualified as crimes against humanity) included in the Rome Statute vis-àvis the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, but these other acts (sexual offenses other
than rape and forcible transfer) had already been incorporated into the ICTY
and ICTR Statutes through case law. See BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra note
126, at 108–09.
165. See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 157, at 102 n.75. That the Latin
American delegations would insist on the inclusion of enforced disappearance
(given the prevalence of such crimes during by the governing right-wing military junta’s in that region during the 1960s through to 1980s ) and the African delegations on apartheid (given the history of apartheid in South Africa
and Rhodesia by minority white governments) is perhaps understandable.
166. See Cassese, supra note 163, at 376; BOAS, BISCHOFF & REID, supra
note 126, at 109. Interestingly other additional acts (that could qualify as
crimes against humanity) were also proposed (but ultimately rejected) during
the drafting of Article 7—these acts were: terrorism (proposed by the Indian,
Sri Lankan, and Turkish delegations), mass starvation (proposed by the Costa Rican delegation), and imposition of economic embargo (proposed by the
Cuban delegation). See von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 157, at 102–03.
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As it currently stands, Article 7 of the Rome Statute is the
most recent international iteration on crimes against humanity
as an international offense. In surveying the doctrinal development of crimes against humanity in the years following the
close of the Second World War, a complex picture has emerged
of a doctrine of international criminal law under constant refinement and interpretation.
Figure 5: The Development of Crimes Against Humanity as an
International Offense
1945 IMT Charter
(Article 6(c))

The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall
be individual responsibility: . . . (c) Crimes against
humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhuman acts committed against
any civilian population, before or during the war; or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of

Crimes Against Humanity

the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
1945 Allied Con-

Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime: . . . (c)

trol Council Law

Crimes against humanity: Atrocities and offences,

No. 10 (Article
II(c))

including but not limited to murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of
the country where perpetrated.

1954 ILC Draft

The following acts are offences against the peace and

Code of Crimes

security of mankind: . . . Inhuman acts such as murder,

Against the Peace

extermination, enslavement, deportation or persecutions,

and Security of

committed against any civil population on social, political,

Mankind (Article

racial, religious or cultural grounds by the authorities of a

2(11))

State or by private individuals acting at the instigation or
with the toleration of such authorities.

1993 ICTY Statute (Article 5)

The International Tribunal shall have the power to
prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes
when committed in armed conflict, whether international
or internal in character, and directed against any civilian
population: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c)
Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e) Imprisonment;
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(f) Torture; (g) Rape; (h) Persecutions on political, racial
and religious grounds; (i) Other inhumane acts.
1994 ICTR Stat-

The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the

ute (Article 3)

power to prosecute persons responsible for the following
crimes when committed as a part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: (a)
Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e) Imprisonment; (f) Torture; (g) Rape; (h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) Other
inhuman acts.

1996 ILC Draft

A crime against humanity means any of the following acts,

Code of Crimes

when committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale

Against the Peace

and instigated or directed by a Government or by any

and Security of

organization or group: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c)

Mankind (Article

Torture; (d) Enslavement; (e) Persecution on political,

18)

racial, religious or ethnic grounds; (f) Institutionalized
discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious grounds
involving the violation of fundamental human rights and
freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part
of the population; (g) Arbitrary deportation or forcible
transfer of population; (h) Arbitrary imprisonment; (i)
Forced disappearance of persons; (j) Rape, enforced
prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse; (k) Other
inhumane acts which severely damage physical or mental
integrity, health or human dignity, such as mutilation and
severe bodily harm.

1998 Rome Stat-

(1) For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against

ute of the ICC

humanity” means any of the following acts when

(Article 7)

committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer or population; (e)
Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery,
enforced

prostitution,

forced

pregnancy,

enforced

sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable

gravity;

(h)

Persecution

against

any

identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender . . . or grounds
that are universally recognized as impermissible under
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international law, in connection with any act referred to in
this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime
of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health.

2. Crimes Against Humanity and Recursive Cycles
As previously illustrated, the Rome Statute’s approach to defining crimes against humanity would differ in several key
points from the ICTY and ICTR approaches. It is in exploring
these differences in detail that a complete picture emerges of
whether crimes against humanity, as a specific category of international criminal offense, is currently subject to the presence of recursive cycles (indicating competing claims and conflicts as to its meaning and application), or if recursive cycles
are not present (indicating acceptance and authority as to
meaning and application). In observing the development of
crimes against humanity as a specific international offense, especially the debates that surrounded its definition and elaboration in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, a picture emerges which
indicates the presence of recursive cycles.
Crimes against humanity, as a category of international offense, is today very much the subject of competing claims and
conflicts as to its meaning and application—a fact very much
highlighted by the debates over its scope and application both
during the drafting of Article 7 of the Rome Statute, and even
before during the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR in the
early 1990s. As previously discussed, the doctrinal development of crimes against humanity as an international criminal
offense only began in earnest at the close of the Second World
War with the IMT Charter and Control Council Law No. 10.
With the publication of the 1954 ILC Draft Code of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the doctrinal development of crimes against humanity came to a virtual standstill for the next forty years, as the ILC became mired in debates over defining the scope and application of the offense.
Part of the problem during this time originated in the fact that
the ILC was working in a vacuum of sorts, as there were no international conventions or jurisprudence on the subject during
this period. This vacuum would set the stage for the first
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mechanism driving recursive cycles of norm-making in relation
to the development of crimes against humanity as an international offense—the “indeterminacy of law.”
The “indeterminacy of law” refers to the ambiguities that can
be inherent in legal instruments (e.g. treaties, statutes, regulations, court opinions, etc.) that can then lead to possible unintended consequences in their application—thereby setting off
repeated rounds of redrafting and reapplication.167 The inability of the ILC to resolve the conflict between the IMT Charter’s
insistence on an armed conflict requirement for crimes against
humanity, and Control Council Law No. 10’s insistence on not
having such a requirement, combined with international silence on the subject (in the form of the absence of any international conventions or jurisprudence regarding the issue during
this period), created an environment where ambiguity prevailed. When in 1993 the ICTY Statute insisted on an armed
conflict requirement, in direct opposition to both the ICTR
Statute that came out a year later, and the final ILC Draft
Code that came out in 1996, the stage was set for redrafting
and reapplication between the various actors. The majority of
this activity took place in the jurisprudence of the ICTY which,
through its case law, began to systematically dilute the armed
conflict requirement in its Statute by declaring that customary
international law no longer required the armed conflict nexus
for the commission of a crime against humanity (and that the
requirement in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute was for jurisdictional purposes only),168 and that the requirement did not demand a material link between the crime against humanity allegedly committed and the armed conflict in question.169 In this
167. See supra Part VI.
168. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defense
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 78 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“Since customary international law no longer requires any nexus between crimes against humanity and armed conflict . .
. , Article 5 was intended to reintroduce this nexus for the purposes of this
Tribunal.”).
169. See Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-AR72.1, Decision on the
Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 13–14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 31, 2004) (“As expressed in the jurisprudence of
the Tribunal, the jurisdictional requirement of Article 5 requires the
existence of an armed conflict at the time and place relevant to the
indictment, but it does not mandate any material nexus between the acts of
the accused and the armed conflict . . . All that is required under Article 5 of
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way, the ICTY, through its jurisprudence, began to bring its
definition of crimes against humanity more in line with those
of the ICTR and 1996 ILC Draft Code. The legal ambiguity that
had existed in the forty years between the end of the Second
World War and the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals manifested itself, then, in driving recursive cycles of norm-making
between these various international actors. The Rome Statute’s
exclusion of the armed conflict requirement in its definition of
crimes against humanity in 1998 did not bring these cycles to
an end. Indeed, if anything, the recursivity has intensified—
witness the recent jurisprudence of the East Timor Special
Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC),170 which although its Statute defines crimes against humanity per the Rome Statute definition (i.e. minus an armed conflict requirement),171 has ruled
in its case law that crimes against humanity require an armed
conflict nexus.172
Recall that although the ad hoc Tribunals were purportedly
designed to apply existing international law,173 their jurisprudence inevitably had a deep effect on the development of certain international offenses, especially those such as crimes
against humanity, that were not very well defined at the time.
The experiences and lessons learned from the work of the ICTY
the Statute is that the prosecution establish that an armed conflict is
sufficiently related to the Article 5 crime with which the accused is charged . .
. there is no need for the Prosecution to establish a material nexus between
the acts of the accused and the armed conflict.”).
170. Following the violence that accompanied East Timor’s independence
from Indonesia in 1999, the U.N. transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET) set up a hybrid international–East Timorese Tribunal (composed
of international and East Timorese judges) to try the serious criminal offenses that took place in 1999. The Tribunal operated from 2000 to 2006. For an
excellent summary of the Tribunal’s work, see generally CAITLIN REIGER &
MARIEKE WIERDA, INT’L CT. FOR TRANSNAT’L JUST., THE SERIOUS CRIMES
PROCESS
IN
TIMOR-LESTE:
IN
RETROSPECT
(2006),
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-TimorLeste-Criminal-Process2006-English.pdf.
171. See Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (Jun.
6, 2000), § 5.
172. See Prosecutor v. Joni Marques et al., Case No. 09/2000, Trial Panel
Judgment, ¶ 684 (U.N. East Timorese Transitional Admin. Special Panel for
Serious Crimes Dec. 11, 2001).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 139, 140.
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and ICTR would directly affect how crimes against humanity
would be defined in the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998, but it
would also set the stage for the second (and final) mechanism
driving recursive cycles of norm-making in relation to the development of crimes against humanity as an international offense—“contradictions.”
“Contradictions” refer to the phenomena that emerge ideologically when clashing visions amongst actors lead to imperfect
legal settlements, or institutionally, when legal implementation is divided out between different institutions.174 The debates referenced earlier that emerged during the drafting of
the Rome Statute over the inclusion of an armed conflict requirement for crimes against humanity, and the specific acts
that could be qualified as crimes against humanity, point to the
Rome Statute as representing not the final conclusive international judgment on the definition of crimes against humanity
as an international offense, but rather instead as a partial and
unstable temporary solution that seeks to incorporate fundamentally incompatible viewpoints. Indeed, not only does debate
still exist on the armed conflict nexus for a crime against humanity, even in the wake of the Rome Statute,175 but the inclusion of additional acts into what had previously been a stable
list of offenses (duplicated in both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes) has generated much controversy.176 These debates
emerged out of ideological clashes between various national
delegations to the Rome Conference, who had their own idiosyncratic reasons (often rooted in very specific historical or social circumstances) for advocating the positions that they
did.177 As a brief concluding aside, compare this state of events
to the parallel doctrinal development of genocide as an international criminal offense, which was subject to both a widely ratified international convention (the “Genocide Convention”)178
174. See supra Part VI.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 170, 171.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 159–66.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 160–66.
178. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide art. II,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. This Convention defines genocide as the targeting of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group with the following acts:
murder, causing serious bodily/mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions designed to destroy the targeted group, preventing births within the
targeted group, and transferring children from the targeted group to another
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and expansive jurisprudential development in the International Court of Justice (the “1951 ICJ Advisory Opinion”).179 Unlike
the situation with crimes against humanity, the definition and
elaboration of genocide as a specific category of international
criminal offense that emerged in the wake of the Genocide
Convention and 1951 ICJ Advisory Opinion (on the Convention) has remained remarkably stable.180
The status of crimes against humanity today as an international offense is well established and not in doubt—the years
following the Second World War, especially the last two decades following the establishments of the ICTY and ICTR, saw
the status of crimes against humanity as a specific type of international crime solidify. What the preceding section has
shown, however, is that the specific doctrinal development of
crimes against humanity is still today very much in flux and
subject to repeated recursive cycles of norm-making. Perhaps
once the ICC begins trying cases in earnest and building a body
of case law, these cycles will dissipate as norm-making episodes
settle and come to an end (indicating acceptance as to application of meaning). Time will tell, although the imperfect legal
settlement that is the Rome Statute may not bode well for such
a clear outcome in the future. This analysis departs radically
from more typical international legal scholarship charting the
development of crimes against humanity. Instead of centering
the investigation on an imprecise methodology charting the
group. Id. art. II. For such acts to constitute genocide, they must be committed with the intent to destroy the targeted group “in whole or in part.” Id.
179. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15 (May 28).
180. Indeed, the main development in the doctrine in the years following
the Genocide Convention and 1951 ICJ Advisory Opinion has not been on its
definition and elaboration as a specific category of international offense applying to individual responsibility, but rather on whether genocide operates
as a category of international civil offense that can hold entire states (rather
than individuals) liable. See Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn.-Herz.
v. Yugo.), Preliminary Objections Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 595, 616 (Jul.
11) (Where the ICJ held that claims for state responsibility for genocide were
admissible under the Genocide Convention.); Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn.-Herz. v.
Serb. and Montenegro), 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 43, 237-40 (Feb. 26) (Where the ICJ
held that Serbia-Montenegro, as a state, was not responsible for genocide
committed in the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the conflict that erupted there in the 1990s.).
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practice of states in the immediate aftermath of the Second
World War, and then coupling with a study of “why” states exactly behaved in this manner, the investigation presented
above takes a more empirical approach focusing on the reality
of the international system as it operates. Instead of ignoring
transnational actors or relegating them to the background, the
analysis presented above recognizes them as the key actors
(within the international system) that they have become.
An analysis of international norm formation anchored in a
framework of legal recursivity, as the example with crimes
against humanity presented above demonstrates, opens up the
study to a whole host of empirical methods. With the example
presented above, one sees a comparative case study181 looking
at comparing the many iterations of crimes against humanity
as an international offense, married with an approach that
charts how the lack of a widely ratified international treaty
and/or accompanying International Court of Justice jurisprudence created an environment where the doctrinal development
of the offense lacked an institutionalizing component182 that
could centrally filter and control the developing elements of the
offense.183 What one had with crimes against humanity’s development was a situation where the struggle between different
actors, both state and transnational, set the stage for “indeterminacy” and “contradictions” to emerge and drive recursive cycles of norm-making across time and space.
CONCLUSION
This article has surveyed the ways in which current interpretations of customary international law are flawed and the deep
uncertainty and confusion over the role of state practice and
opinio juris within the customary element. It has also illustrated how new theories of customary international law have
proved inadequate in clarifying the current state of the field,
and how the heavily state-centric bias of customary international law, as currently conceptualized, fails to take into ac181. See supra text accompanying notes 114, 115.
182. By taking a view that conceptualizes institutions as both shaping behavior and mediating outcomes, the analysis of the doctrinal development of
crimes against humanity presented very much keeps in line with classically
historical institutionalist approaches from political science. See discussion
supra note 119.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 177–80.
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count the very real affects norm-generating transnational actors have on the international system. This article has also discussed “conceptual stretching,” an idea coined by the social scientist Giovanni Sartori to describe the distortions that result
when established concepts are introduced to new cases without
the required accompanying adaption, and has suggested that
the current confusion rampant in customary international law
can be traced to how its current conceptualization, relying as it
does on the dual attributes of state practice and opinio juris, is
“conceptually stretched.” Utilizing Sartori’s “ladder of abstraction,” a new framework for studying customary international
norms has been suggested, one that looks to general theories of
norm formation. In pursuing this line of inquiry, the idea of
“legal recursivity” proposed by legal sociologists Terence Halliday and Bruce Carruthers has been suggested as a more apt
description of how, in a new international system dominated by
norm-generating transnational actors, international norms develop and operate. “Legal recursivity” examines how norms can
be exchanged and transferred between the transnational governmental, quasi-governmental, and non-governmental institutions within the international community as a whole, and domestic states. In short, the framework proposed is the following:
Figure 6: A Recursive Framework of Norm Formation
More Abstract (low intension, high extension)
(Concept: General Norm Formation)
Attributes: -The
Physical
Element
(driven by cycles of “legal
recursivity”)
Less Abstract (high intension, low extension)
(Concept: Customary International Norm Formation)
Attributes: -The
Physical
Element
(state practice)
-The Mental Element (opinio juris)
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“Legal recursivity,” as a description of how international norms
develop and operate (and indeed interact with national norms)
points a way forward for international scholarship towards a
more rigorous, scientific, and thus empirical approach, as evidenced in the case study presented documenting the development of crimes against humanity as an international offense.
The international system is on pace to become ever more complex as transnational actors both continue to expand their areas of jurisdiction and persist in their efforts to influence state
behavior. Under such circumstances, research into the development and operation of individual international norms becomes all the more vital. Individual issue areas aside, system
level questions also still abound as to how and why norms
change character (e.g. from “hard” law to “soft”), why normmaking shifts between different actors in the international system, what factors precede a norm-making episode (and whether
they are important), and what the implications (if any) of different timing sequences in norm-making episodes are.184 International legal scholarship could have much to contribute in the
exploration of these phenomena were it to adopt a more empirically based approach.

184. Halliday, supra note 6, at 271, 276.

